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Introduction: The new interventionism 
The year 2003 marked a significant change in Australia's 
relations with the island Pacific, including Papua New Guinea 
(PNG). Since gaining independence in the 1970s, the island 
states of the Southwest Pacific have been left to control their 
own political and economic affairs. While providing substantial 
amounts of bilateral aid, Australia has been sensitive to charges 
of neo-colonialism and interference with national sovereignty. 
All this has changed, however, with the Australian Government's 
adoption of a distinctly more robust and interventionist stance 
under Prime Minister John Howard. The primary objective is 
to enhance security and stability in troubled Pacific states. 
Although poverty reduction continues to be the broad goal, the 
Australian aid program is being gradually calibrated to reflect 
this changing approach. In practice, this also entails the 
deployment of growing numbers of Australian personnel in key 
government agencies in recipient countries. 
The two principal manifestations of this new policy have 
been the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) in mid 2003 and the proposed Enhanced 
Cooperation Program (ECP) to PN G. Australia has also recently 
provided police commissioners to both Fiji and Nauru. Nauru, 
which is effectively bankrupt, is the subject of intensified 
engagement. Another aspect of the new approach has been a 
renewed focus on strengthening the institutions of regional 
governance. In August 2003, the Australian Government secured 
the appointment of a former Australian diplomat as the new 
secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, the 
premier regional political body. This reversed a longstanding 
convention that only Pacific Islanders were eligible for 
appointment. Prime Minister John Howard has made clear that 
future Australian aid to the Pacific will be linked to efforts by 
recipient governments to improve standards of governance and 
combat corruption. The new hands-on approach has inevitably 
ruffled feathers, particularly among an older generation of 
independence leaders who resent the Australian Government's 
stridency and the perceived threat this represents to national 
sovereignty. 
However, among other observers, including many ordinary 
Pacific Islanders, Australia's re-engagement is something to be 
welcomed. It provides a· rare opportunity to assist regional 
governments to address the diverse and growing challenges they 
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have faced in recent years. Indeed, if Australia's new commitment 
is sustained, it provides the most important opportunity for 
broad-ranging reform since the era of decolonisation in the 
1970s. Of course, much depends on what kind.of changes are 
being proposed and whose interests are being promoted. While 
the Australian Government. has its own national interest and 
security agenda to pursue, achieving effective and sustainable 
reform in the island Pacific requires active participation and 
ownership on the part of the governments and citizenry of the 
countries concerned. 
What lies behind the changes in 
Australian policy? 
Concerns about aid effectiveness 
The growing critique of Australian development assistance to 
the region has had a major impact on the Australian 
Government. This critique involves an unlikely convergence 
between critics on both the left and right of the political 
spectrum. On the left, critics from within recipient countries 
and Australia have derided the aid program as 'boomerang aid', 
whereby the principal beneficiaries are the Australian companies 
and consultants who manage and implement AusAID projects. 
On the right, there is the work of conservative economists such 
as Helen Hughes and Peter Bauer (Bauer et al. 1991), both 
working for the Sydney-based think tank, the Centre for 
Independent Studies. Hughes's 2003 report, Why Aid Has Failed 
the Pacific, received widespread publicity and struck a 
sympathetic chord in senior government circles. In it, she argues 
that Australian aid has failed to deliver on its promises and, 
moreover, that it is implicated in the dynamics of political and 
economic dysfunction in the region by fuelling corruption and 
engendering dependency among recipient states. 
The reality of aid and its impacts is, of course, significantly 
more complex and diverse than these critiques imply. There 
have been successes as well as failures. Likewise, the potential 
link between aid and government corruption has diminished 
with the move from budgetary support to tied aid. The case for 
simply ending aid is unlikely to find much support, even among 
the most ardent critics in the recipient countries. At the same 
time, few would deny that the Australian aid program can be, 
and needs to be, improved in terms of its practical outcomes. 
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The changing strategic environment 
The single most important factor in changing Australian 
Government's thinking about the region has been the 
dramatically changed international strategic environment since 
the September 11 attacks in the United States and the Bali 
bombings. Having aligned itself closely with the Bush 
~dministration in Washington, the government has adopted the 
'war on terror' as the principal lens for viewing issues of conflict 
and instability in the region. Within this expanded cgncept of 
securiry, the notion of' failed' or 'failing' states has become pivotal 
to the identification of perceived threats to Australian securiry 
interests and the mobilisation of preventive and remedial 
responses. 
The case for intervention in Solomon Islands was set within 
this broader strategic framework and was articulated most clearly 
in the influential report published by the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute (ASPI) in June 2003. Solomon Islands is 
identified as a failing state. The report provides vivid warning 
of the risk of its reversion into 'a kind of post-modern badlands, 
ruled by criminals and governed by violence' (ASPI 2003:13). 
State failure in Solomon Islands would, in AS PI's view, render 
it susceptible to the predatory and violent activities of local 
warlords, transnational crime syndicates and maybe even 
terrorist organisations. Such a scenario would not only be 
catastrophic for Solomon Islands, it would pose a direct threat 
to Australia's own security interests. The risk of state failure in 
our immediate neighbourhood has become the basis of the new 
securiry paradigm. Within this paradigm, the focus is squarely 
upon the manifestations of state failure and the threat these 
present to Australia, rather than upon the internal dynamics of 
failure in the country concerned. 
The ASPI report also provides a regional perspective, noting 
that while the Solomon Islands state is closest to 'total collapse', 
some of its Melanesian neighbours are not that far behind. The 
next cab off the rank, in the view of many in government, is 
PNG, Australia's largest and most challenging Pacific neighbour. 
There have been longstanding concerns about rising levels of 
financial mismanagement, corruption, political instability, and 
law and order in PNG. These concerns, in combination with 
the renewed focus on regional security and the success of the 
first phase of RAMSI, culminated in the Australian 
Government's offer of a substantial package of enhanced 
assistance to the PNG Government late last year, subsequently 
agreed to at the Ministerial Forum in Adelaide in December 
2003. 
Difficulties with concept of 'failed states' in 
Melanesian context 
While the concept of'failed' or 'failing' state is now used regularly 
in the Pacific Islands context, there have been few attempts to 
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ground it in the particular histories and socio-political contexts 
of the region's post-colonial states. It has become a convenient 
device for justifYing various forms of external engagement, rather 
than an instrument of analysis. The notion of a 'failed' or 
'collapsed' state assumes that at some point it was functioning 
properly, presumably in a manner similar to the 'successful' states 
of Australia and New Zealand. However, even a cursory reading 
of the short history of states in PNG, Solomon Islands or 
Vanuatu serves to dispel this assumption. The Melanesian state 
has never operated effectively in the way it has in Australia and 
New Zealand. On the contrary, one can argue that the main 
problem of state in these Melanesian countries is that it has yet 
to be properly built. We are still talking about the nascent stages 
of state and nation building in countries with a short experience 
of centralised administration, among the highest levels of ethnic 
diversiry in the world, and, as yet, little sense of common identiry. 
Beneath many aspects of today's challenges of governance 
in the Melanesian countries lies the lack of fit between the 
introduced institutions of the modern nation state and the 
multiplicity of indigenous micro-polities and social forms that 
continue to adapt and exert influence at all levels of 'modern' 
sociery. The consolidation of state power remains incomplete 
and has been resisted intermittently at local levels in parts of 
Solomon Islands, PNG and Vanuatu during both colonial and 
post-independence periods. 'National' politics continues to be 
grounded in localism rather than national interest. Almost 30 
years after independence, the sociopolitical realities in each of 
these countries remain relentlessly local. 
Following on from this, the challenge of state building in 
Solomon Islands or PNG is not to simply rebuild that which · 
has ostensibly 'failed' or 'collapsed'. Indeed, to do so might be 
to simply invite future 'failure'. What is needed is a different 
approach to state building that addresses directly the complexities 
of trying to build a unitary state and sense of 'nation' in such 
fragmented and diverse environments. This cannot be achieved 
quickly or simply engineered through a massive infusion of 
external resources and expertise. Nor can it be accomplished by 
focusing exclus"ively on state structures. It is the dysfunctional 
character of state-society relations that needs to be addressed if 
sustainable improvement is to be achieved. 
The Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands 
RAMS I was deployed in July 2003 in response to an appeal from 
the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Sir Allan Kemakeza. What 
began as an ethnic conflict had degenerated, since the Townsville 
Peace Agreement in October 2000, into the effective capture and 
paralysis the Solomon Islands state by a small cohort of armed 
ex-militants, including renegade police officers ·and corrupt 
leaders. Australia's response was to mobilise a regional assistance 
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mission led by a police contingent of some 330 officers, mainly 
from Australia but with participation from other Pacific Forum 
member states. The Participating Police Force (PPF) was initially 
supplemented by around 1800 military personnel from the region, 
again mainly Australian. The military force has been gradually 
reduced as the security situation has improved. Restoring law 
and order was the immediate priority, to be followed by a 
comprehensive reform program aimed at stabilising government 
finances, balancing the budget and reviving investor confidence, 
as well as strengthening the law and justice sector and rebuilding 
the Solomon Islands police force. 
As mentioned earlier, the initial phase of RAMS I has gone 
remarkably well. A significant number of the illegally held high-
powered weapons have been surrendered or confiscated. The most 
notorious former militants are now behind bars and peace has 
returned to Honiara and other areas affected by the recent conflict. 
RAMSI's efforts to cleanse the Solomon Islands police of criminal 
and corrupt elements have resulted in the resignation or dismissal 
of over 25 per cent ofserving officers. With the restoration oflaw 
and order, the mission has now entered its second and more 
challenging phase involving the implementation of comprehensive 
governance and economic reform. 
While popular support for RAMS I remains high, there are 
some issues that need to be addressed if the mission's longer 
term objectives are to be achieved. RAMSI's leadership is well 
aware of most of these issues and is seeking to address them. 
The first relates to a concern expressed by many Solomon 
Islanders that RAMS I has been less zealous in prosecuting cases 
of high-level corruption than it has in relation to criminal 
activities by former militants. This, in turn, has fuelled a belief 
in some quarters that RAMS I inadvertently provides a cloak of 
legitimacy for corrupt leaders and a government that have 
limited legitimacy in the eyes of many Solomon Islanders. For 
its part, RAMS I officials have expressed frustrations at the lack 
of reliable evidence on which to base prosecutions in these cases 
and have regularly called for members of the public to provide 
relevant evidence. 
Another broad concern relates to what ap"pears to be the 
limited opportunities for ordinary Solomon Islanders to 
participate in and influence the work of RAMS!. The sheer 
scale of RAMS I in terms of the resources at its disposal and the 
range of activities it is involved in underlie its popular image as 
the dominant force in post-conflict Solomon Islands. Without 
the active participation and engagement of Solomon Islanders, 
there is a risk that RAMS! will simply reinforce dependence on 
external assistance. Solomon Islands academic Tarcisius 
Kabutaulaka points out that RAMSI's dominance could lead to 
either a debilitating dependency or, alternatively, a perception 
offoreign occupation (Kabutaulaka 2004). He notes the popular 
saying' weitem olketa RAMS! bae kam stretim' ('wait fo.r RAMS I, 
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they'll fix it'), as an expression of this growing dependency. The 
very prominent stance adopted by senior RAMS I and Australian 
High Commission officials in opposing the Honiara 
government's award of a pay increase to public servants in 
January 2004 bordered on political interference and attracted 
criticism in both Solomon Islands and Australia (Wielders 
2004). There is a thin line between RAMSI's dominant position 
in post-conflict Solomon Islands and perceptions that it is 
actually _the 'real' government in control of political and 
economic decision making. Such perceptions cannot, of course, 
be resolved by RAMS I alone. There is a clear need for decisive 
leadership among Solomon Islanders and a much more active 
participation in the reform process. 
RAMSI's post-conflict recovery work has understandably 
focused on key state institutions, such as the police and finance 
ministries. In the longer term, it is also important to engage with 
non-state entities that continue to exercise considerable influence 
over the lives of ordinary Solomon Islanders. These include the 
churches, NGOs and other agencies of civil society. Building social 
and economic capacity at local levels is a critical aspect of nation 
building in Solomon Islands. As Kabutaulaka puts it: 'To achieve 
sustainable peace and rebuild Solomon Islands there is a need to 
strengthen both state and non-state entities. This is especially 
important in a plural society where the state will always share 
power with other organizations' (2004:2). The work of the 
Australian-supported Solomon Islands Community Peace and 
Restoration Fund is a good example of how this engagement with 
communities can be nurtured. 
There is also the question of what kind of state system is 
most appropriate to Solomon Islands' present and future needs. 
The highly centralised model inherited at independence is 
implicated in many aspects of recent problems. While there are 
serious flaws in current proposals to adopt a federal system, 
reform of the existing framework of government, in particular, 
relations between the political centre and the island provinces, 
needs to be prioritised. It is also important to ensure adequate 
levels of consultation and debate about the economic and public 
sector reforms being implemented under the auspices of RAMS I. 
Reforms that accentuate existing divisions between regions and 
individuals and that fail to improve access to services and 
economic opportunities among the bulk of the rural population 
will lead to growing levels of discontent and could result in 
future conflict. 
Enhanced Cooperation Program in 
Papua New Guinea 
The Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) in Papua New 
Guinea includes additional Australian assistance to policing, 
law and justice, and border management, as well as economic 
and public sector management. Up to 230 Australian police 
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officers will be deployed in Port Moresby, Lae, Mount Hagen 
and along the Highlands Highway, as well as up to 20 officers 
in Bougainville. Four hundred new PNG police will also be 
recruited under the program. The policing component has been 
casted at A$800 million over a five-year period and is additional 
to the existing A$350 million a year Australian aid program to 
PNG. While many of the civilian officials are already at work, 
the deployment of Australian police has been delayed owing to 
disagreement between Australian and PNG governments over 
their conditions of employment. This has centred on Australia's 
insistence that they be provided with immunity from prosecution 
under PNG law and PNG's refusal to grant blanket immunity. 
Power plays in the PNG parliament around a possible vote of 
no confidence against the government have resulted in further 
delays. The impasse over immunity now appears to have been 
resolved and, subject to the ratification of the new treaty by 
both the Australian and PNG parliaments, Australian police 
should be in position within a few months. 
Some members of PNG's political elite have expressed 
reservations about Australia's new approach and, in particular, 
about parallels drawn between PNG and the 'failing state' in 
Solomon Islands. Although there are similarities, there are also 
important differences between the two countries. There has 
been no armed takeover in Port Moresby, nor the forcible 
ousting of a democratically elected government. While the 
state and the police force may be weak, they have certainly 
not collapsed. Likewise, PNG's well-known law and order 
problems are not the result of a major internal conflict. PNG 
has long been the largest single recipient of Australian 
development assistance and a significant amount of this has 
been directed at the law and justice sector and, in particular, 
the police. Although there have been some improvements, the 
otherwise disappointing results of almost 15 years of Australian 
aid to the PNG police has been another important contributor 
to the formulation of the ECP. 
There is no denying that PNG faces major challenges of 
financial management, economic development, governance, 
corruption, political stability, and law and order. While some 
have taken exception to the Australian Government's new 
stridency, a younger generation of political leaders and many 
ordinary Papua New Guineans see the offer of additional 
assistance in more positive terms; as a chance to make a real 
start in addressing long-neglected problems. In many respects, 
the recent friction between Australia and PNG has been more 
about style than substance. There i~ broad agreement on both 
sides that the Australian aid program can be made more effective. 
The ECP is no panacea, but it does offer much-needed assistance 
in areas requiring urgent attention. 
As with RAMS I in Solomon Islands, there are a number of 
broad issues that can be raised in respect of the ECP. Much of 
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the marketing of the ECP to the domestic Australian audience 
has focused on the perceived threats to Australian security 
presented by its lawless northern neighbour. This has included 
an emphasis on PNG's alleged susceptibility to transnational 
crime and terrorism. While this may be an effective way of selling 
the program in Australia, it is less convincing in the PNG 
context. Threats of international crime and terrorism in PNG 
are dwarfed by more pressing internal security matters. PNG's 
'law and order' problems are complex and diverse. They are not 
simply a reflection of the weakness of the law and justice system. 
While that system, particularly policing, needs to be 
strengthened, there is also a need to address some of the 
underlying issues that are contributing to high levels of internal 
conflict and lawlessness. This would include the larger processes 
of urbanisation, impoverishment (particularly in rural areas), 
and marginalisation of a significant proportion ofPNG's young 
and rapidly growing population. In short, many of the so-called 
law and order problems are simply not susceptible to law and 
order solutions alone. 
Papua New Guinea has already embarked on an ambitious 
program to reform its law and justice system. It is important 
that the additional support provided under the ECP be 
integrated into this existing reform program. The law and justice 
component of the ECP is highly state-centric with its focus on 
strengthening the principal agencies of the formal justice system. 
PNG's new law and justice policy also emphasises the need to 
mobilise and strengthen community-based resources in order 
to strengthen dispute resolution and peacemaking at community 
levels. The community orientation of this policy recognises that 
there are many examples of successful dispute resolution and 
peacemaking occurring in communities throughout PNG and 
that these provide an important foundation for building a more 
socially appropriate and sustainable justice system. The 
remarkable example of grassroots reconciliation and peace 
building in post -conflict Bougainville provides the most dramatic 
example of this largely invisible and untapped resource. It is 
important that the assistance provided under the ECP does not 
detract from the longer-term goal ofbuilding justice capacity at 
both state and community levels. 
Conclusions 
Australia's renewed engagement with its troubled Melanesian 
neighbours is to be welcomed. It provides a unique window of 
opportunity for addressing some of the most outstanding 
challenges facing the governments and peoples of the region. 
Having embarked on this path, it is important that the Australian 
Government enters into genuine partnerships with recipient 
governments and the broader communities in the countries 
concerned. Achieving adequate levels of local ownership and 
participation is critical to the effectiveness and sustainability of 
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these initiatives. 
The whole-of -government approach involved in these 
engagements also presents new challenges. There are now more 
bits of the Australian Government involved in development 
assistance than at any time since independence. Issues of 
coordination are clearly critical, not least to avoid reproducing 
Canberra's bureaucratic rivalries in Honiara or Port Moresby. It 
is also clear that the Prime Minister's office has adopted a l~.:ad 
role in the formulation and steering of Australia's -new 
interventionism. This will have inevitably contributed to some 
tension and resentment, particularly among the traditional 
institutional providers of development assistance, notably 
AusAID and the Department of Foreign Mfairs and Trade. It 
also means that key decisions are being made increasingly by 
those lacking extensive regional and development experience. 
A further generic concern relates to the state-centric character 
of the assistance being offered under the auspices of these 
engagements. The weakness of state in Melanesia reflects, in 
part, the glaring disconnect berween the realms of formal and 
non-formal governance. The latter continues to have 
considerable impact at all levels of modern society. 'Top-down' 
solutions do not have an impressive track record in the region. 
Indeed, some would argue that the traditional focus on state 
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institutions has actually contributed to recent problems of 
instability and disorder. While addressing the deficiencies of 
particular state institutions is necessary, it is also important to 
engage with structures and processes at local and community 
levels. 
A final point relates to the sustainability of these new 
engagements. With the deployment of increasing number of 
Australian personnel, the obvious question is what happens when 
they leave? Ensuring the long-term sustainability of these 
programs remains a major issue. 
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